The first order modal logic F OS4 is a combination of the axioms and rules of inference of propositional S4 and classical first order logic with identity. We give a topological and measure-theoretic semantics for F OS4 with expanding domains. The latter extends the measure-theoretic semantics for propositional S4 introduced by Scott and studied in [3], [6], and [8] . The main result of the paper is that F OS4 is complete for the measure-theoretic semantics with countable expanding domains. More formally, F OS4 is complete for the Lebesgue measure algebra, M, or algebra of Borel subsets of the real line modulo sets of measure zero, with countable expanding domains. A corollary to the main result is that first order intuitionistic logic F OH is complete for the frame of open elements in M with countable expanding domains. We also show that F OS4 is not complete for the real line or the infinite binary tree with limits with countable expanding domains.
Introduction
It is well-known that the propositional modal logic S4 can be interpreted in topological spaces. In the topological semantics, formulas are assigned to subsets of a fixed topological space, and the 2-modality is interpreted by the topological interior. As early as 1944, McKinsey and Tarski [9] showed that S4 is complete for the real line, the rationals, Cantor space, and many 'nice' metric topologies. 1 In recent years, Scott showed that in addition to the topological semantics, we can interpret S4 in the Lebesgue measure algebra, or algebra of Borel subsets of the real line modulo sets of measure zero. Here each propositional variable is assigned to an element of the algebra, instead of to a subset of a topological space. Conjunctions, disjunctions and negations are interpreted by Boolean meets, joins and complements respectively, and we can construct an interior operator on the algebra that interprets the 2-modality. The measure-theoretic semantics (as I'll refer to it) is in some ways reminiscent of the older topological semantics, particularly of topological interpretations over the real line. It was shown in [6] and [3] that S4 is complete for the Lebesgue measure algebra. 2 Thus when it comes to propositional S4 we have many nice completeness theorems in both the topological and measure-theoretic semantics. But once we pass to quantified or first order modal logics, the landscape changes quite dramatically. In the topological semantics for quantified S4, we can think of each point in a topological space as carrying a first order model. Formulas are true or false at points in the topological space, and true for the model as a whole if true throughout the space. The topological semantics for quantified modal logics has been studied far less than its propositional counterpart, but what little we do know shows that completeness results for particular spaces are harder to come by. Take QS4, the quantified modal logic that combines the axioms and rules of inference of propositional S4 with the identity-free fragment of classical first order logic. It was shown in [10] that QS4 is not complete for any Baire space with countable constant domains. This result was recently extended in [5] , where Kremer shows that QS4 is not complete for any locally connected space with arbitrary constant domains. In particular, QS4 is not complete for the real line with arbitrary constant domains. Perhaps the only 'nice' completeness result for a particular topological space is the proof in [5] that QS4 is complete for the rationals with countable constant domains. Now Rasiowa and Sikorski [10] , and Kremer [5] all study constant domain semantics for identity-free quantified modal languages. The focus of the present paper is on first order modal languages that contain identity, and the logic F OS4, which combines the axioms and rules of inference of propositional S4 with those of classical first order logic. In order to give a semantics for F OS4, we need to consider models in which the domain of individuals varies across points in space. Indeed, in the more familiar Kripke (or frame) semantics for quantified modal logics it is well known that there are many choices to be made as to whether and how domains can vary across possible worlds. In an 'expanding domain' semantics, the domain at a world is a subset of the domain of related worlds (equivalently, individuals can come into existence as one moves along the accessibility relation, but cannot go out of existence-hence 'expanding'). 3 Are there analogs for this in the topological or measure-theoretic semantics? At first sight, it is not clear how there could be. The very idea of expanding domains is defined in terms of the accessibility relation in Kripke frames, a relation that has no place in the topological, much less algebraic semantics. But in fact there are natural analogs in both cases. Just as the accessibility relation interprets modality in Kripke semantics, so the topological interior or open sets interpret modality in the topological semantics. In the expanding domain Kripke semantics, we require that an object which exists at a world w exists at all worlds downstream from w; analogously, in the expanding domain topological semantics we require that an object that exists at a point x exists throughout an open neighborhood of x. (A similar constraint can be introduced in the algebraichence also measure-theoretic-semantics but we save the details for §8.) As we'll see below, the expanding domain topological semantics for F OS4 generalizes the expanding domain Kripke semantics for F OS4 in much the same way that the topological semantics for propositional S4 generalizes Kripke semantics for propositional S4. 4 This raises interesting questions. If we pass from constant domains to expanding domains in the topological semantics, do we recover completeness for nice metric spaces? This paper studies expanding domain semantics for the full first order logic F OS4. A preliminary result of the paper is that F OS4, and its identity-free fragment QS4, are not complete for the real line with countable expanding domains or for the infinite binary tree with limits (defined below) with countable expanding domains. It is an open question whether completeness holds with arbitrary expanding domains. The main result of this paper is that F OS4 is nevertheless complete for the Lebesgue measure algebra with countable expanding domains. It follows that QS4-the logic studied in [10] and [5] -is also complete for the Lebesgue measure algebra with countable expanding domains. By the Gödel translation, first order intuitionistic logic F OH is complete for the frame of open elements in the Lebesgue measure algebra (defined below). These somewhat surprising results show that the topological semantics over the real line and the measure-theoretic semantics come apart once we pass from propositional modal systems to first order modal systems with countable expanding domains. They also show that the measure-theoretic semantics is a nice setting for interpreting first order modal languages.
A brief guide to the paper is as follows. In §2 we review the first order modal logic F OS4. In §3 and §4 we recall the expanding domain Kripke semantics and the expanding domain topological semantics for FOS4. In §5 and §6 we prove several incompleteness results in the topological semantics. In particular, we show that F OS4 is incomplete for the real line with countable expanding domains, and F OS4 is incomplete for the infinite binary tree with limits with countable expanding domains. In §7 - §9 we develop an expanding domain algebraic semantics for F OS4. In §10 we introduce the 'modally expanded' Lebesgue measure algebra, and recall some important properties of this algebra. In §11 and §12 we prove the main result of the paper: completeness of F OS4 for the Lebesgue measure algebra with countable expanding domains.
The logic FOS4
Let L be a first order modal language with a countable set of variables, countable sets P red n of n-ary predicate symbols for each n > 0, the identity predicate =, the binary connective ∧, unary operators ¬, 2, and the quantifier ∃. In addition, the connectives ∨, ⊃, ↔, and the operators 3, ∀ are defined in terms of these in the usual way. 5 For any set D, the language L(D) is the result of expanding the language L to include every element of D as a term. We refer to formulas and sentences in the language L(D) as Dformulas and D-sentences. If φ is a D-formula, x is a variable, and t is a term (including a member of D), then φ[x|t] is the result of substituting t for every free occurrence of x in φ.
We use 'x' to denote an n-tuple of variables x 1 , . . . , x n . We use φ(x) to denote a formula in the language L with free variables among the set {x 1 , . . . , x n }. For any n-tuple a = a 1 , . . . , a n of elements in a domain D, we let φ(a) be the result of substituting a k for every free occurrence of x k in the formula φ(x) (1 ≤ k ≤ n). If φ is a formula in the language L, the universal closure of φ, denoted ∀φ, is the sentence ∀x 1 . . . ∀x n φ where x 1 , . . . , x n are precisely the variables that occur free in φ. 6 model gives rise to an equivalent expanding domain topological model. The correspondence is not one-to-one. While Awodey and Kishida prove completeness of F OS4 for the class of all topological spaces in [2] , they do not explore the question of whether F OS4 is complete for sheaf interpretations over any particular topological space. This is the subject of §5 and §6 of the present paper.
Definition 2.1. The first order modal logic F OS4 is a combination of the axioms and rules of inference for propositional S4 and the usual axioms and rules of inference for classical first order logic. More precisely, we take as our axioms all formulas of the following form, where x and y are variables, and φ and ψ are formulas in L:
where the term t is substitutable for x in φ; Universal Distributivity: ∀x(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (∀xφ ⊃ ∀xψ); Vacuous Quantification: φ ⊃ ∀xφ where x does not occur free in φ; Reflexivity of Identity: x = x Indiscernibility of Identicals: x = y ⊃ (φ ⊃ φ ) where φ is atomic and φ is the result of replacing x in zero or more places by y in φ together with the rules of inference
It is well-known that the converse Barcan formula
is a theorem of F OS4, but the Barcan formula
is not a theorem of F OS4.
Kripke Semantics
Kripke semantics for propositional modal logics is widely familiar. In this section we recall how to extend the semantics to first order modal languages. As mentioned above, we have many options regarding whether and how individuals should be allowed to vary from one world to another. For F OS4 however, the appropriate semantics uses expanding domains. Formally, if an individual exists at a world u then it exists at all worlds related to u by the accessibility relation. The reason for this is that the converse Barcan formula is a theorem of F OS4 while the Barcan formula is not. (A constant domain semantics would validate both the Barcan formula and its converse.) Definition 3.1. A propositional S4 Kripke frame is a pair W, R where W is a non-empty set, and R is a reflexive, transitive binary relation on W .
Since we are concerned exclusively with frames in which R is transitive and reflexive (i.e., S4 frames) we refer to propositional S4 Kripke frames as propositional Kripke frames, or simply propositional frames.
In order to get a first order semantics, we must add to our propositional frames both a system of domains and a system of equivalence relations on domains that interprets identity. In what follows, we use 'a', 'b', 'c' . . . to denote n-tuples of elements in the relevant domain,
is a KFE and ξ = (ξ u ) u∈W is a family of functions ξ u : P L → P(D n u ) that respect -i.e., such that
(where PL denotes the set n>0 P red n of predicate letters).
Let M = F, ξ be a KFE-model, where F = W, R, D, . We say that M is defined over the propositional Kripke frame W, R . We say that M has a countable domain if the total domain D + is countable.
We define the modal forcing relation (|=) between the model M , a world u ∈ W , and a D u -sentence φ as follows. 1 . M, u |= P a 1 . . . a n iff a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ ξ u (P )
Let M = F, ξ be a KFE-model, where F = W, R, D, , let F be the propositional frame W, R , and let φ be a sentence in L. We say that φ is true in
open formula in L, we say φ is true in M if its universal closure ∀φ is true in M . 7 For any formula φ in L, we say φ is valid in F with expanding domains if φ is true in every model defined over F . We say that φ is valid in F with countable expanding domains if φ is true in every model defined over F in which the total domain, D + , is countable. 8 If C is a class of propositional Kripke frames, 7 Alternatively, we can say that φ is true in M iff for all u ∈ W and all a ∈ D n u , M, u |= φ(a). 8 One could also define a different notion of validity with countable expanding domains according to which φ is valid in F if φ is true in every model defined over F in which the domain at each world is countable. Thus the total domain need not be countable. Validity in this sense entails validity in the sense defined above, but not vice versa. we say that φ is valid in C with (countable) expanding domains if φ is valid in each propositional frame in C with (countable) expanding domains. Finally, F OS4 is complete for a class C of propositional Kripke frames with (countable) expanding domains if φ valid in C with (countable) expanding domains ⇒ φ ∈ F OS4 Definition 3. 4 . We say that a propositional Kripke frame W, R is countable if W is countable.
The following theorem is proved in [11] . 9 Theorem 3.5. Let C be the class of countable rooted propositional Kripke frames. Then F OS4 is complete for C with countable expanding domains. Proposition 3.7. Let F = W, R and F = W , R be propositional Kripke frames, and let σ be a p-morphism from F to F . Let M = W , R , D , , ξ be a KFE-model defined over the propositional frame, F . Define the model M = W, R, D, , ξ over the propositional frame F by putting, for each u ∈ W :
• For all a ∈ D n u , a ∈ ξ u (P ) iff a ∈ ξ σ(u) (P ).
Then for any u ∈ W and D u -sentence φ,
It follows from surjectivity of σ that for any sentence φ in the language L,
Corollary 3.8. Let the models M and M be as in the previous proposition. Then for any formula φ in L, M |= φ iff M |= φ.
The proof of the following simple corollary is left to the reader.
Corollary 3.9. Let C and C be classes of propositional Kripke frames such that for each frame F ∈ C there is a frame F ∈ C such that F is a p-morphic image of F . If F OS4 is complete for C with (countable) expanding domains, then F OS4 is complete for C with (countable) expanding domains.
We now turn to a specific Kripke frame that has commanded much attention: the infinite binary tree. Let 2 <ω consist of all finite sequences over the set {0, 1}, including the empty sequence which we denote by Λ. We say that an element s ∈ 2 <ω has length n if it is a sequence of n 0's and 1's. We denote by s * 0 (s * 1) the sequence of length n + 1 with initial segment s and ending in 0 (ending in 1). For any s, t ∈ 2 <ω , we put sR t iff t = s * 0 or t = s * 1. Let R be the reflexive, transitive closure of R . Then the infinite binary tree is the frame 2 <ω , R . We will be a bit informal and identify the set 2 <ω with the Kripke frame 2 <ω , R .
The following proposition is proved in [5] :
Proposition 3. 10 . Every countable rooted S4 Kripke frame is the p-morphic image of the infinite binary tree, 2 <ω . 
Topological Semantics
Each S4 propositional frame F = W, R can be viewed as a topological space, X F , where W is the underlying set of points in the space, and a subset of W is open if it is closed under the accessibility relation R. 10 The topological space determined in this way is Alexandroff -the intersection of an arbitrary collection of open sets is open. Moving in the reverse direction, every topology X gives rise to a propositional S4 Kripke frame, F X = W, R where W is just the set X, and xRy iff x belongs to the closure of {y} 11 (The reader can verify that R so defined is reflexive and transitive.) It is not difficult to show that when the space X is Alexandroff, these processes are inverses of one another. That is,
This gives a one to one correspondence between Alexandroff topologies and propositional S4 Kripke frames.
(Since every finite topology is Alexandroff, the class of finite propositional Kripke frames just is the class of finite topological spaces.)
We would like to interpret modal languages not just in Alexandroff topologies, but in topological spaces more generally. In this section, we show how to generalize the expanding domain Kripke semantics for first order modal logics to an expanding domain topological semantics. Points in a topological space play the role of worlds in Kripke frames. So just as in Kripke semantics for F OS4 each world 'carries' a first order model, in the topological semantics each point in space carries a model.
But what is the analog of the expanding domain condition? If we think of an S4 propositional Kripke frame W, R as a topological space, the open sets are just those subsets of W closed under the accessibility relation R. Thus the smallest open set containing a world w is the set of worlds v such that wRv. This means that we can rephrase the expanding domain condition in topological terms as follows: if an individual d exists at w, then d exists throughout the smallest open set containing w. We can now see how to generalize 'expanding domains' to the fully general topological setting, where our space X may not be Alexandroff. Indeed, expanding domains is the requirement that if an individual d exists at a point x ∈ X, then d exists throughout some open neighborhood of x. Definition 4.1. A topological space with equality is a triple X, D, where
Again, we let D + = x∈X D x and refer to D + as the 'total domain.' (If D x = D y for all x, y ∈ X, and x is the identity function on D x for all x ∈ X, we say that the topological space with equality has constant domains.) is a topological space with equality and ξ = (ξ x ) x∈X is a family of functions ξ x : P L → P(D n x ) that respect -i.e., such that a ∈ ξ x (P ) and
We say that the model M is defined over the space X.
We say that a topological model with equality, M = X, D, , ξ , has a countable domain if D + is countable.
Let M = F, ξ be a topological model with equality, where F = X, D, . We define the modal forcing relation (|=) between M , a point x ∈ X, and a D x -sentence φ as follows.
For any formula φ in L, we say φ is valid in X with expanding domains if φ is true in every model defined over X. We say φ is valid in X with countable expanding domains if φ is true in every model defined over X in which the total domain D + is countable. If C is a class of topological spaces, we say that φ is valid in C with (countable) expanding domains if φ is valid in each member of C with (countable) expanding domains. Finally, F OS4 is complete for a class C of topological spaces with (countable) expanding domains if
With slight abuse of notation, we will use 'complete for X,' to mean complete for the singleton class {X}.
We can use the correspondence between propositional Kripke frames and Alexandroff topologies to show that every model over a KFE corresponds to some model over the corresponding Alexandroff space, and vice versa. For any propositional frame F = W, R let us denote by X F the topology corresponding to that frame. Then if M = W, R, D, , ξ , the corresponding topological model with equality is just M = X F , D, , ξ . Note that D, , and ξ are the same in both models, it is just that in M we think of these functions as defined over a frame, whereas in M we think of them as functions defined over a topological space. 
Since it makes no difference whether we think of a propositional Kripke frame as a frame or as a topological space, if F OS4 is complete for some class of frames, then F OS4 is complete for the corresponding class of topological spaces.
Let us now turn to truth preserving maps in the topological semantic, the topological analog of pmorphisms. Let ξ be a topological model with equality defined over Y and define the model M = X, D, , ξ over X by putting:
Then for any x ∈ X and any D x -sentence φ,
It follows from the surjectivity of f that for any sentence φ in the language L, Corollary 4.7. Let X and Y be topological spaces, and let f : X → Y be an interior, surjective map. If F OS4 is complete for Y with (countable) expanding domains, then F OS4 is complete for X with (countable) expanding domains.
The Real Line
Many of the topological spaces that interest us are non-Alexandroff-among these, familiar metric spaces like the real line R, the rationals Q, Cantor space, and so on. It is time then to consider some 'nice' topological spaces, and ask whether the logic F OS4 is complete for these spaces.
The main result of this section is that F OS4 is not complete for the real line with countable expanding domains. This is proved as a special case of a more general result: namely, that F OS4 is not complete for any Baire space with countable expanding domains. We prove this using a counterexample from [10] , that was used to prove incompleteness of QS4 (the identity-free fragment of F OS4) for the reals with countable constant domains. Our work here is to show that this counterexample extends to F OS4 with countable expanding domains.
Let X be a topological space. Recall that a set A ⊆ X is boundary if its complement is dense in X. A is nowhere dense if its closure is boundary. Finally, A is first category if it is a countable union of nowhere dense sets. A topological space X is a Baire space if the intersection of any countable collection of open dense sets in X is also dense in X.
Proposition 5. 1 . Every subset of a Baire space of the first category is boundary. Proof . Suppose X is a Baire space, and A ⊆ X is of the first category. Then A = n∈N A n where A n is nowhere dense for each n ∈ N. But then X − Cl(A n ) is open and dense in X. Since X is a Baire space, the set S = n∈N X − Cl(A n ) is dense, hence X − S = n∈N Cl(A n ) is boundary. It follows that n∈N A n is boundary, as any subset of a boundary set is boundary.
Proposition 5.2. The formula ψ = 3¬∃x(P x ∧ ¬23P x) is valid in any Baire space with countable expanding domains. Proof . Suppose not. Then for some Baire space X, topological model M = X, D, , ξ , and x ∈ X, we have M, x |= 3¬∃x(P x ∧ ¬23P x), where D + is countable. It follows that there is an open set O ⊆ X with x ∈ O such that M, y |= ∃x(P x ∧ ¬23P x) for all y ∈ O. So for each y ∈ O, M, y |= P a ∧ ¬23P a for some a ∈ D y . For any D + -formula φ, let 3 . ||P a ∧ ¬23P a|| is a nowhere dense set for each a ∈ D + . Proof . If x ∈ ||P a ∧ ¬23P a||, then x ∈ ||P a|| and x ∈ ||¬23P a||. It follows that x ∈ Int Cl||P a|| (else M, x |= 23P a). Hence x ∈ ||P a|| − Int Cl||P a||. This shows that ||P a ∧ ¬23P a|| ⊆ ||P a|| − Int Cl||P a||, and RHS is clearly a nowhere dense set. Hence ||P a ∧ ¬23P a|| is nowhere dense. 12 Since D + is countable, it follows from Claim 5.3 that a∈D + ||P a ∧ ¬23P a|| is a set of the first category. By Proposition 5.1, this set is boundary. But O is a non-empty open set, and O ⊆ a∈D + ||P a ∧ ¬23P a||. ⊥.
Proposition 5. 4 . The formula ψ in Proposition 5.2 is not a theorem of F OS4.
Proof. In [10] it is proved that ψ is not provable in QS4, which is the identity-free fragment of F OS4. It follows that ψ is not provable in F OS4. The following theorem, called the Baire Category Theorem, can be found in any standard topology textbook.
Theorem 5. 6 . Every complete metric space is a Baire space.
Corollary 5. 7 . F OS4 is not complete for the real line, R, Cantor space, or the irrationals with countable expanding domains. Proof . The result for the real line and Cantor space is immediate from Theorem 5.5 and Theorem 5. 6 . Incompleteness for the irrationals follows from the fact that the set I of irrationals (with the subspace topology) is also a Baire space (not proved here).
The validity of the formula ψ shows that F OS4 is not complete for the real line with countable expanding domains. But it is not difficult to show that the same formula is not valid in the real line once we pass to arbitrary expanding domains. Indeed, this follows from the fact proved in [10] that ψ is not valid in the real line with arbitrary constant domains.
Open Question 5. 8 . Is F OS4 complete for the real line with arbitrary expanding domains?
It was shown in [5] that the formula
is valid in the real line with arbitrary constant domains, and that φ is not a theorem of QS4-hence also not a theorem of F OS4. (Thus QS4 is not complete for the real line with arbitrary constant domains.) 13 The question naturally arises whether in passing to expanding domains (countable or arbitrary), the formula φ is still valid on the reals. The next proposition shows that it is not. Thus the question of completeness for the real line with arbitrary expanding domains remains open. 12 In fact, ||P a ∧ ¬23P a|| = ||P a|| − Int Cl||P a||, but we only need the inclusion here. 13 The result is a special case of the theorem that φ is valid in any locally connected topological space with arbitrary constant domains, which is proved in [5] .
Proposition 5.9. φ is not valid in the real line with countable expanding domains.
Proof. Let M = R, D, , ξ , where
• ξ x (P ) = {0} for all x ∈ R Clearly D = (D x ) x∈X is an expanding system of domains, since the set of points where 0 exists (R) and the set of points where 1 exists (R − {0}) are both open. Moreover, is a family of equivalence relations, and trivially ξ respects the relation . We show that M |= φ. To this end, we show that 
At z = 0, M, z |= ¬P 1. It follows that for any y = 0, there is an open set O with y ∈ O such that M, z |= ¬P 1 for all z ∈ O. But then M, y |= 2¬P 1, so M, y |= 2¬P 1 ∨ 2P 1. Also, from the proof of 1.
This shows that for every point x ∈ R, M, x |= ∀x(2¬P x ∨ 2P x). It follows that, M, 0 |= 2∀x(2¬P x ∨ 2P x).
It follows from 2. that M, 0 |= 2∀xP x; it follows from 3. that M, 0 |= 3∃x(3P x ∧ 3¬P x). Therefore, M, 0 |= φ. Since D + is countable-indeed, finite-φ is refuted in R with countable expanding domains.
For any topological space X, let Figure 1 : A check marks the logics to which the formula belongs; an ex marks the logics to which it does not.
The Infinite Binary Tree with Limits
In recent work ( [4] , [7] ) the real line has been studied in connection with another interesting topological space, the infinite binary tree with limits. This is the space we get by adding 'limit' points, or infinite sequences, to the infinite binary tree studied above, and taking as basic open sets the cones generated by finite sequences. More formally, Definition 6.1. Let 2 ≤ω denote the set of countable sequences of 0's and 1's including the empty sequence, which we denote by Λ. In keeping with the notation of §3, we let 2 <ω denote the set of finite sequences of 0's and 1's. For any s ∈ 2 <ω , let B s := {s * t | t ∈ 2 ≤ω } where s * t is the concatenation of s with t. Then B = {∅} ∪ {B s | s ∈ 2 <ω } is closed under finite intersections, hence is the basis for some topology τ over 2 ≤ω . We call the space (2 ≤ω , τ ) the infinite binary tree with limits. We will be a bit informal and identify the set 2 ≤ω with the space (2 ≤ω , τ ).
The following proposition was proved in [7] and [4] .
There is an interior, surjective map from R to 2 ≤ω . Proposition 6.3. F OS4 is not complete for 2 ≤ω with countable expanding domains. In particular, the formula ψ given in §5 is valid in 2 ≤ω with countable expanding domains but is not a theorem of F OS4. Moreover, the formula φ given in §5 is valid in the limit tree 2 ≤ω with arbitrary constant domains, but is not valid in 2 ≤ω once we pass to expanding domains, as the proposition below shows. 14 Proposition 6.5. The formula φ := ∀x2P x ⊃ (2∀xP x ∨ 3∃x(3P x ∧ 3¬P x)) is not valid in 2 ≤ω with countable (hence also arbitrary) expanding domains. The reader can verify that M, Λ |= φ.
Remark 6. 6 . In the terminology of the previous section, we have shown that QM L(2 ≤ω ) ℵ 0 e , QM L(2 ≤ω ) ℵ 0 c , QM L(2 ≤ω ) e and QM L(2 ≤ω ) c are all distinct. The inclusion of formulas φ and ψ in these logics is again mapped in Figure 1 , replacing R with 2 ≤ω .
The 'Global' Approach
In the next section we turn to the algebraic semantics for F OS4, of which the measure-theoretic semantics is a special case. As a prelude to the work carried out there, it will help to take a second look at the topological semantics presented in §4. Here we view that semantics in a slightly different way-one that lends itself more readily to the algebraic point of view.
Suppose that X is a topological space and M = X, D, , ξ is a model over X. We defined the system of domains D = (D x ) x∈X , the family of equivalence relations = ( x ) x∈X , and the family of valuation functions ξ = (ξ x ) x∈X locally, by indexing each to points in X. In other words, the model M , as understood in §4, tells us for a given point in the space, what individuals exist at that point and what atomic formulas are true at that point.
We could have instead adopted a 'global' approach to topological models. 15 On such an approach, our starting point is simply a global domain of individuals, D. First, we specify for each individual in D the points in space where that individual exists. Next, we specify for each pair of individuals in D the points in space where those individuals are identified. Finally, for each predicate letter P we specify a function from tuples of individuals in the global domain to subsets of the topological space. The subset associated with a tuple of individuals is the region throughout which the tuple is in the extension of P . Of course, we must be careful to ensure that a predicate is true of a tuple of individuals only at points where all of those individuals exist. So certain restrictions are necessary. Mathematically, however, the local and global approach to models are interchangeable.
The definitions below make this more precise.
Definition 7.1.
A global topological space with equality is a triple F = X, D, E , where X is a topological space, D is a non-empty set, and E : D × D → P(X) satisfies the conditions:
(E5) E(a, a) = ∅ for all a ∈ D.
Note that as a consequence of (E1) and (E2), E(a, b) ⊆ E(a, a) and E(a, b) ⊆ E(b, b).
For any a ∈ D we let E(a) = E(a, a). Informally we think of E(a) as the region of space where the individual a exists. We extend the function E to pairs of n-tuples in the domain by putting
Again we put E(a) = E(a, a). Informally we think of E(a) as the region of space where all of the coordinates of a exist. Thus in the global approach, the function E plays the role of both the individual domains D x and the functions x in the local approach-it tells us where individuals exist and where any pair of individuals are identified.
Definition 7.2.
A global topological model with equality is a pair M = F, γ where F = X, D, E is a global topological space with equality and γ = (γ P ) P ∈P L is a family of functions γ P : D n → P(X) such that
We sometimes refer to γ as a global valuation. Note that condition 1 ensures that a predicate is true of an n-tuple of individuals only where each of the individuals exists. Moreover, 2. ensures that the global valuation γ respects the identifications drawn by E.
It is not difficult to see that each 'local' topological model gives rise to a global topological model, and vice versa. Indeed, suppose that X, D, , ξ is a topological model with equality. We define the corresponding global model X, D G , E, γ by putting
Readers can convince themselves that X, D G , E, γ satisfies the conditions of Definition 7.1. Likewise, if X, D G , E, γ is a global topological model with equality, we can define the corresponding local model X, D, , ξ by putting a ∈ D x iff x ∈ E(a) and using clauses 2. and 3. above to define and ξ. (Again the reader should check that the local model thereby defined satisfies the conditions of Definition 4.2). 16 
Algebraic Semantics
In the algebraic semantics for F OS4 we interpret modal formulas in a topological Boolean algebra, or Boolean algebra together with an interior operator (defined below). Each formula is assigned to an element of the algebra, which we can think of loosely as the largest 'region' throughout which the formula is true. Unlike both the Kripke and topological semantics, there is no notion here of truth at a 'world' or 'point'; points in an important sense disappear.
How then to capture the idea of a system of expanding domains? We'll see that even without points or worlds we can simulate expanding domains in an arbitrary topological Boolean algebra. The algebraic semantics given below is a generalization of the topological (hence also Kripke) semantics for F OS4: every topological model is equivalent to some algebraic model. The notation of this section follows [11] , with departures where convenient. Definition 8. 1 . A topological Boolean algebra (TBA) is a Boolean algebra A together with an operator I on A that satisfies: For any a, b ∈ A,
We say that I is an interior operator on A. If Ia = a, we say that a is an open element of the algebra, A. We denote by 'C' the dual of I (i.e. Ca = −I − a). We say that a is closed if −a is open, or equivalently, Ca = a.
As usual, a TBA is complete if it is closed under arbitrary joins. We denote the top element of the algebra by 1, and the bottom element by 0.
Example 8.2. Let X be a topological space, and for any subset S ⊆ X, let I(S) denote the topological interior of S. Then the powerset P(X) forms a Boolean algebra where meets, joins, and complements are respectively set-theoretic intersections, unions, and complements. Moreover, I is an interior operator on the algebra, making it a topological Boolean algebra.
We denote the topological Boolean algebra of the previous example by B(X). 
Remark 8. 4 . Note that condition (E4) together with (I2) in Definition 8.1 ensures that E(a, b) is an open element of the algebra, A. 17 It is convenient to work with complete algebras, but this is not strictly speaking necessary. One can define models over an algebra that is not complete, so long as the joins (and therefore also meets) corresponding to open formulas exist. See, e.g., [10] . In fact, as an anonymous referee points out, we could have defined a modal valued structure (m.v.s.) more generally as a triple A, D, E where A is a TBA closed under joins of the same size as D (but not necessarily complete). Then we could say that a formula is valid in A if it is true in every model A, D, E, γ , where A, D, E is a m.v.s. over A. Thus there is a notion of validity for formulas in algebras that are not complete, but for simplicity we stick to the definitions given above.
Let F = A, D, E be a modal valued structure. With slight abuse of notation, let
for any a ∈ D. Informally, we think of E(a) as the largest region in the algebra A where a exists. For any n-tuples a, b ∈ D n , let E(a, a) . Informally we think of E(a) as the largest region in the algebra A where every coordinate in a exists.
Proof. This follows from Definition 8. 3 . In particular,
Definition 8. 6 . An algebraic model is a pair M = F, γ where F = A, D, E is a modal valued structure and γ = (γ P ) P ∈P L is a family of functions γ P : D n → A such that for any a, b ∈ D n ,
We call γ a valuation and say that the model M is defined over the algebra A.
For any D-sentence φ, let E(φ) = {E(a) | a ∈ D and a appears in φ} Informally, we can think of E(φ) as the region throughout which it makes sense to ask if φ is true. We observe the usual convention that the meet of the empty set is 1 (and the join of the empty set is 0). Therefore, when φ is a sentence in L (φ does not contain any d ∈ D), E(φ) = 1.
Let F, γ be an algebraic model. We extend the function γ to the set of all D-sentences as follows. It is not difficult to show that
According, as before we treat ¬, ∧, 2, ∃ as basic, and the other connectives and modal operators as shorthand.
Note that for any D-sentence φ,
is not equal to 1, we do not have γ(φ ∨ ¬φ) = 1. The latter equality is, of course, true for sentences in the language L, but fails for sentences in L(D) when E(φ) = 1. We said previously that we can think of E(φ) informally as the region throughout which it makes sense to ask if φ is true; now we can say more precisely that E(φ) = γ(φ ∨ ¬φ).
Let M = F, γ be an algebraic model with F = A, D, E . We say that a D-sentence φ is true in
For any formula φ, φ is valid in A with expanding domains if it is true in every model defined over A. φ is valid in A with countable expanding domains if φ is valid in every model defined over A with a countable domain D. F OS4 is complete for A with (countable) expanding domains if φ valid in A with (countable) expanding domains ⇒ φ ∈ F OS4
Clearly, if φ is valid in A with expanding domains, then φ is valid in A with countable expanding domains, but the converse implication need not hold. Likewise, if F OS4 is complete for A with countable expanding domains, then F OS4 is complete for A with expanding domains, but the converse is not in general true. If we restrict attention to an identity-free language, and use only constant-domain algebraic models, the algebraic semantics given here is a notational variant of the algebraic semantics in Rasiowa and Sikorski [10] . 19 In the remainder of this section we show that the algebraic semantics just given is a generalization of the topological semantics for F OS4 presented in §4. We do this by showing that every local topological model corresponds to some algebraic model. 20 If M = F, ξ is a topological model with equality where F = X, D, , we can define the corresponding algebraic model M alg = B(X), D + , E, γ , by putting
We say that M alg is the algebraic model determined by M . To see that this is in fact an algebraic model, the reader should verify that (1) E satisfies conditions (E1) -(E5) in Definition 8.3, (2) γ P (a) ≤ E(a), and
Moving in the reverse direction, suppose we begin with an algebraic model M = B(X), D, E, γ over an algebra B(X). We can construct a topological model M top = X, D top , , ξ by putting:
The reader should verify that the conditions of Definition 4.2 are satisfied-in particular, that (1) x is an equivalence relation for each x ∈ X, (2) D is an expanding system of domains, (3) ξ x (P ) ⊆ D n x , and finally (4) a ∈ ξ x (P ) and a x b ⇒ b ∈ ξ x (P ).
We say that M top is the topological model determined by M . It is not difficult to see that the processes just described are inverses of one another. That is, if M is a topological model then (M alg ) top = M , and if M is an algebraic model over an algebra B(X) then (M top ) alg = M . We omit the proof here, but note that condition (E5) was introduced to guarantee the latter equation.
Proposition 8. 9 . If M = X, D, , ξ is a topological model with equality and M alg = B(X), D + , E, γ is the algebraic model determined by M , then for any x ∈ X and any D x -sentence φ,
Proof. By induction on the complexity of φ. Note that if φ is a D x -formula, then a ∈ D x for every a that appears in φ. Therefore x ∈ E(a) for each such a and x ∈ E(φ). We show only the three cases below; the rest is routine.
Base.
M, x |= P a 1 . . . a n iff a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ ξ x (P )
To see that the arrow in the penultimate step can be reversed, suppose that
If, on the other hand, y is not free in φ then
The simple proofs of the following proposition and corollaries are left to the reader. Corollary 8.12. If X is a topological space, then for any formula φ in the language L, φ is valid in B(X) with (countable) expanding domains iff φ is valid in X with (countable) expanding domains. It follows that F OS4 is complete for X with (countable) expanding domains iff F OS4 is complete for the algebra B(X) with (countable) expanding domains.
Proof. Suppose that φ is valid in B(X) with expanding domains. Let M be a model over X, and let M alg be the algebraic model determined by M . Since φ is valid in B(X), M alg |= φ. By Corollary 8.11, M |= φ.
Since M is an arbitrary model over X, we conclude that φ is valid in X with expanding domains. For the restriction to countable domains, note that if M has a countable domain, then M alg has a countable domain. Conversely, suppose that φ is valid in X. Let M be a model over B(X). Then M top is a model over X, and since φ is valid in X, M top |= φ. By Corollary 8.11 , (M top ) alg |= φ. But by the observation above, M = (M top ) alg , so M |= φ. Since M is an arbitrary model over B(X), we conclude φ is valid in B(X). Again, for the restriction to countable domains, note that if M has a countable domain, then M top has a countable domain.
For the second part of the corollary, suppose F OS4 is complete for X with (countable) expanding domains. If φ ∈ F OS4 then φ is not valid in X with (countable) expanding domains. By the first part of the corollary, φ is not valid in B(X) with (countable) expanding domains. Therefore F OS4 is complete for B(X) with (countable) expanding domains. The converse is proved similarly.
Completeness Transferring Maps
We are interested in maps between topological Boolean algebras that preserve completeness. More precisely, suppose that A 1 and A 2 are TBA's, and F OS4 is complete for A 1 with countable expanding domains. What sort of map from A 1 to A 2 guarantees that F OS4 is also complete for A 2 with countable expanding domains? Such maps will ultimately allow us to transfer completeness from one class of algebras to another. We'll see below that the relevant concept is that of an embedding preserving countable joins. (The reason we focus here on completeness transfer for algebras with countable expanding domains is that our ultimate goal is to prove completeness for the Lebesgue measure algebra with countable expanding domains.) Definition 9.1. Let A 1 and A 2 be complete topological Boolean algebras (TBAs). A function h :
h is a homomorphism if h is a Boolean homomorphism and
Finally, h is an embedding if it is an injective homomorphism. We say that h preserves countable joins if for every countable set {a n | n ∈ N}, h( n∈N a n ) = n∈N h(a n ) 
Then for any D-sentence φ,
Proof. First note that for any D-sentence φ,
where the meet is taken over all a ∈ D such that a appears in φ. The first part of the proposition is proved by induction on φ. For the second part of the proposition, we have:
The proof of the following corollary is identical to that of Corollary 3.8 and Corollary 4.5. We have shown that embeddings which preserve countable joins transfer completeness of F OS4 from one algebra with countable expanding domains to another. The next proposition shows that where the relevant algebras are fields of sets, B(X) and B(Y ), each interior surjective map from X to Y gives rise to an embedding from B(Y ) and B(X) that preserves countable (indeed, arbitrary) joins. Thus the truthpreserving maps of the topological semantics give rise to truth preserving maps between corresponding algebras in the algebraic semantics.
For the remainder of this paper, if X and Y are topological spaces and f :
for each S ⊆ Y . We say that h f is the algebraic function determined by f . The proof of the following proposition is straightforward and is left to the reader. 
The Lebesgue measure algebra
Above we studied the algebraic semantics in general terms. We now turn to a specific algebra of particular interest: the Lebesgue measure algebra, or algebra of Borel subsets of the real line modulo sets of measure zero. 21 The algebra was first introduced as a model for modal logics by Dana Scott and subsequently studied in [6] , [8] , and [3] .
Interpreting modal languages in the Lebesgue measure algebra is clearly similar in some ways to interpreting these logics over the real line (in the topological semantics). We know from McKinsey and Tarski's completeness result in [9] that propositional S4 is complete for the real line; and it was shown independently in [6] and [3] that propositional S4 is also complete for the Lebesgue measure algebra. But when we pass to first order languages-indeed, even to quantified languages without identity-things quickly become more complex. We saw above that F OS4 is incomplete for the real line with countable expanding domains, and in [5] it was shown that QS4 (the identity-free fragment of F OS4) is incomplete for the reals with arbitrary constant domains. In the remainder of this paper we show that F OS4 is nevertheless complete for the Lebesgue measure algebra with countable expanding domains. In this section we recall how to enrich the Lebesgue measure algebra with an interior operator to interpret the 2-modality, and show that the counterexample to completeness for the reals discussed in §5 can be refuted in the algebra.
Let Recall that the collection of Borel subsets of a topological space is the smallest σ-algebra of subsets of the space containing all open sets. Every Borel subset of the real line is Lebesgue measurable. 22 We could just as well take the algebra of Borel subsets of the entire real line modulo sets of measure zero. Indeed, this algebra is isomorphic to M. We use the Borel subsets of [0,1] instead of the whole real line because this gives a normalized measure on the algebra.
Since every set belonging to a given equivalence class has the same measure, we can define a measure m on M by putting m(|A|) = µ(A)
where 'µ' denotes ordinary Lebesgue measure restricted to the Borel subsets of [0,1]. Thus M is a measure algebra. We refer to it as the Lebesgue measure algebra. It is proved in, e.g., [6] , that M is complete (i.e., closed under arbitrary joins). In order to interpret modal languages in M, we must construct an interior operator on the algebra. We say that an element a 
For the reverse inequality, suppose that b is an upper bound on the set {|A n | | n ∈ N}. The next proposition shows that the counterexample to completeness for R given in §5 can be refuted in M.
Proposition 10. 4 . The formula ψ = 3¬∃x(P x ∧ ¬23P x) is not valid in M with countable expanding domains. Proof The measure of the set of points removed over the course of construction of K is
It follows that the measure of the fat Cantor set K is 1 −
It is easy to see that by modifying the length of removed middle intervals in the construction, we can construct fat Cantor sets of measure arbitrarily close to 1. For n ≥ 1, let K n denote the fat Cantor set of measure
Recalling that C is the dual of I, C|K n | = |K n |. Moreover, it is shown in [6] that I |K n | = 0. We use these facts to construct a model over M that refutes the formula ψ.
Let M = M, D, E, γ be an algebraic model over M, where
The reader can check that E satisfies conditions (E1) -(E5) and that γ satisfies the conditions of Definition 8. 6 . So M is an algebraic model with a countable domain. We show that M refutes ψ in M. Indeed,
and ψ is refuted in M with countable domains.
Note that the model that appears in the proof of Proposition 10.4 has a countable constant domain (see Remark 8.8 ). This raises the following question.
Open Question 10. 5 . Is QS4 (the identity-free fragment of F OS4) complete for M with countable constant domains? Remark 10. 6 . F OS4 is not complete for M with constant domains, because the formula ∀x∀y(x = y → 2x = y) is valid in any algebra with constant domains but it not a theorem of F OS4. 25 11 Completeness of F OS4 for M In this section we prove the main result of the paper: completeness of F OS4 for the Lebesgue measure algebra M with countable expanding domains. Our strategy is to transfer completeness from the infinite binary tree 2 <ω to M via a series of embeddings. More precisely, we first show that there is a subset X 0 of the real interval [0,1] with measure 1 and an interior, surjective map f : X 0 → 2 <ω . This map yields an embedding h f : B(2 <ω ) → B(X 0 ). We then construct an embedding π : h f (B(2 <ω )) → M. The composition of these two maps is an embedding π • h f from B(2 <ω ) into M. By completeness of F OS4 for B(2 <ω ) and the results of §9, we show that F OS4 is complete for M. Thus h is a surjective embedding, and M ∼ = M 0 .
Recall the infinite binary tree, 2 <ω discussed in §3. By Theorem 3.11, F OS4 is complete for 2 <ω with countable expanding domains. In keeping with the results of §4, we can view this propositional Kripke frame as a topological space. The open sets of the space are just those subsets of 2 <ω that are closed under the binary accessibility relation R.
The proof of the next proposition is deferred until §12. For the remainder of this section, we let M 0 be the quotient algebra Borel(X 0 ) \ Null X 0 .
Proposition 11.5. The projection map π : h f (B(2 <ω )) → M 0 defined by π(A) = |A| is an embedding preserving countable joins. Proof . Note that π is well-defined because by Proposition 11.3, part 2., each element in h f (B(2 <ω )) is a Borel subset of X 0 . Clearly π preserves finite Boolean operations. 27 Moreover, by Lemma 10.3, we know that for any countable collection {A n } n∈N of Borel subsets of X 0 ,
Thus π preserves countable joins. So we need only show that π is injective and preserves interiors.
Injective.
Let A, B ∈ h f (B(2 <ω )), with A = B. Then A = f −1 (S 1 ) and B = f −1 (S 2 ) for some S 1 , S 2 ⊆ 2 <ω . Since A = B, S 1 = S 2 . So there exists y ∈ S 1 S 2 . Since f is surjective, there exists x ∈ X 0 with f (x) = y. Moreover, f satisfies part 3. of Proposition 11.4 , and the whole space X 0 is open, so µ(f −1 (y)) > 0. But f −1 (y) ⊆ A B. Hence µ(A B) > 0, and |A| = |B|. This shows that π is injective.
